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Cold War Counter-Terrorism:  
 
The Evolution of Canadian Domestic Counter-Terrorism in the RCMP Security Service, 
1972-1984 
  
Abstract: This piece provides a detailed case study of the evolution of counter-terrorism within a 
specific domestic security agency of a liberal-democratic state in the context of the Cold War. It 
does so by examining the creation of domestic counter-terrorism unit within Canada’s Royal 
Canadian Mounted Police Security Service and how it responded to international terrorism. This 
occurred in between major terrorist attacks in Canada in 1970 and 1985 and included a growing 
focus on counter-terrorism even as counter-subversion remained a top priority within a still 
dominant Cold War domestic security framework. Ultimately, the article, based on thousands of 
pages of previously secret documents, argues that the Security Service could conceive of in a 
broader strategic sense the threat of terrorism but found it more challenging, for a variety of 
reasons, including the dominance of the Cold War and the difficulties around infiltrating ethnic 
communities, to collect intelligence.  
INTRODUCTION1 
 
 Since the attacks of 11 September 2001, domestic security agencies in a number of 
liberal-democratic countries have had one key national security priority: counter-terrorism.2 
Questions remain, however, about whether such agencies created during or even prior to the 
Cold War are fit for counter-terrorist purposes in a post-Cold War era.3 After all, terrorism did 
not suddenly appear once the Cold War had finished. Rather, domestic security agencies, in the 
1960s and 1970s, found themselves having to adjust to new security concerns with the 
emergence of terrorism, or re-emergence in some cases, even while espionage and subversion 
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associated with communism remained their top priority. This was true in the United Kingdom 
with the Security Service (MI5) and the violence in Northern Ireland plus some Middle Eastern 
terrorism, and in the United States with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and threats 
posed by far-left violence from the Weather Underground and the far right through the Ku Klux 
Klan.4  
The threat of terrorism, particularly international terrorism, also had an impact on 
Canadian domestic security.  In a 1973 speech, John Starnes, the first civilian head of its 
domestic intelligence agency, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) Security Service, 
warned of the increasing threat of international terrorism to Canada and what its implications 
might be over the coming decades.5 Underlying his comments was disquiet framed in security 
terms about an increasingly diverse Canada that had ended official racial discrimination in its 
immigration policy in 1962. 6   
Canada and Canadians are no more immune to international terrorist activity than 
any other country or people. Indeed, for various reasons, Canada offers a more than 
usually attractive target. Canada has a wealthy post-industrial society 
indistinguishable from its powerful southern neighbour. We have at least one 
revolutionary cause important enough to attract outside support and our travel and 
immigration controls are almost non-existent.7  
In this passage, Starnes alluded to Canada’s recent experience of terrorism, the battle with the 
Front de libération du Québec (FLQ) across the 1960s that culminated in the ‘October Crisis’ of 
1970 when the British Trade Commissioner to Canada, James Cross, and a Quebec provincial 
cabinet minister, Pierre Laporte, were kidnapped by different FLQ cells. Laporte’s kidnappers 
later murdered him while Cross was rescued.8 Although the FLQ reflected international trends in 
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in relation to a broad movement of decolonization and other intellectual and terrorism currents, it 
was perceived by the Canadian state as a domestic terrorist threat.9 In the aftermath of the 1970 
violence in Quebec, which effectively marked the end of the FLQ as a serious terrorism threat, 
Starnes’ speech instead focused on the new international terrorism landscape dominated at the 
time by the Palestinians in the aftermath of the notorious killing of 11 Israeli Olympic team 
members by Black September at the 1972 Munich Olympics.  
Terrorism would become a much discussed phenomenon for the remainder of the 1970s 
and into the decade that followed. Eventually, a second major terrorism attack involving Canada 
occurred. On 23 June 1985, Sikh extremists based in Canada but with international links blew up 
Air India Flight 182 travelling from Toronto to Montreal to London to Delhi to Mumbai. All on 
board--329 people including 268 Canadians--died off the coast of Ireland. It remains the worst 
ever terrorist attack on an airline and the deadliest mass murder in Canadian history.10   
   This paper will offer a unique and detailed case study of the evolution of a specific 
domestic security agency in a liberal-democratic state during the Cold War in response to the rise 
of international terrorism as a threat. Details of similar transformations in the United Kingdom 
and the United States can be found in various places but not as the centre of the works in 
question.11 Nor have questions around the linkage between subversion and terrorism and 
multiculturalism during the Cold War been historicized within a study of counter-terrorism. This 
paper will analyse the beginnings of a movement of a domestic intelligence agency away from 
what it had done for decades toward what has become the main security priority in the 21st 
century. Ultimately, the RCMP Security Service succeeded in terms of imagining accurately 
what an era of international terrorism might consist of and in describing what problems those 
engaged in counter-terrorism might face but experienced difficulties for a variety of structural 
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reasons, including the impact of the Cold War on domestic security priorities, when it came to 
the practical aspect of generating and acting on intelligence related to such threats. And, in 
echoes of the domestic security landscape after 9/11, the RCMP Security Service expressed 
growing concerns about non-Western European immigration to Canada in security terms around 
the threat of terrorism. This process of ‘securitizing’ these communities would remain relevant 
after 9/11 and equally reflected an on-going Cold War mentality in which  security state 
‘othered’ subversive threats as foreign.12  
COUNTER-TERRORISM HISTORY 
This study is neither a history of the RCMP Security Service nor a comprehensive 
account of counter-terrorism across the broader Canadian state. The definitive history of the 
Security Service and domestic intelligence in Canada appeared in 2012 with Reg Whitaker, 
Gregory Kealey, and Andrew Parnaby’s superb Secret Service: Political Policing in Canada 
From the Fenians to Fortress America.13 That work is a macro history of Canadian domestic 
intelligence including how it responded to major terrorist incidents such as the October Crisis 
and the Air India bombing. It does not provide an account of the rise of counter-terrorism in the 
Security Service in response to the threat of international terrorism in the 1970s. The same point 
applies to the excellent False Security: The Radicalization of Canadian Anti-Terrorism by two 
legal scholars, Craig Forcese and Kent Roach. It spends part of one page discussing the Security 
Service’s counter-terrorism in the 1970s in the context of its disruption operations against 
suspected Quebec separatists.14  Another relevant study, an article published in 1993, looks at 
counter-terrorism at an elite level in terms of government responses to acts of violence. Finally, 
J.I. Ross, offers a fascinating examination of the bureaucratic evolution of Canadian counter-
terrorism policy between 1977 and 1999.15  
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This study, in contrast, is a micro study of the development of a counter-terrorism role in 
Canada’s domestic intelligence agency in the 1970s and early 1980s. It is based on thousands of 
pages of previously secret RCMP Security Service records, including organizational charts, 
acquired by the author through over 40 requests under the Canadian Access to Information Act. 
The material, however, was not released uncensored. When the Security Service records were 
transferred to the National Archives of Canada (now Library and Archives Canada) in the 1980s, 
the RCMP Security Service’s successor, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) 
retains final control over what gets released through an Access to Information request. 
Documents are frequently heavily censored for a variety of reasons, including to protect the 
identities of human sources and intelligence-gathering methods. Assistance, including through 
supplied intelligence, from foreign governments and their agencies is almost always censored in 
its entirety. Some material in relation to living individuals or those who have been deceased for 
less than 20 years is additionally removed under the Privacy Act. For those who have worked 
with records of Canadian intelligence agencies obtained through Access, even in relation to 
materials that are decades old, the end result is inevitably a partial picture, frequently lacking in 
intimate details, as demonstrated by censored passages elsewhere in this article. Nevertheless, 
the documents released do demonstrate wider trends and developments.16 
This article emphasises the importance of historical research as a tool for historicizing 
debates and discussion around terrorism and responses to terrorism.  It is also about addressing 
issues within terrorism research of the type identified by others. For instance, Martha Crenshaw 
has written about the ahistorical and event driven quality to some terrorism research and Andrew 
Silke points out the dominance of certain disciplines when it comes to publications about 
terrorism.17 Indirectly addressing these points, there has been a growing amount of scholarship 
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exploring terrorism in an historical context, witness Martin Miller’s The Foundations of Modern 
Terrorism and the Randall Law edited Routledge History of Terrorism, although this is less true 
of counter-terrorism in general and more specifically examinations of Canadian counter-
terrorism.18 In turn, there have been a number of important critiques from historians of some of 
the dominant trends in scholarship and ideas about terrorism and counter-terrorism, including the 
premise of ‘new terrorism’.19 In another recent book, Disciplining Terror, sociologist Lisa 
Stampnitzky illustrates the importance of the 1970s in determining future perceptions of 
terrorism and dominant trends in terrorism studies as a discipline.20 There is some evidence of 
change around interpreting terrorism during this period in public comments by senior Mounted 
Policemen.  Starnes’ successor as Director General of the RCMP Security Service, Michael 
Dare, observed in a 1974 speech that ‘international terrorism like aggression or subversion, is not 
a precise concept which lends itself to definition…. [there] is no internationally-accepted [sic] 
definitions of international terrorism’.21 Six years later, in talking points prepared for the then 
RCMP Commissioner, such definitional hesitation had vanished: ‘Terrorism may be defined as 
the threat or use of violence by any individual or group, indiscriminately or against selected 
targets, to achieve a political objective’.22 
THE RCMP SECURITY SERVICE AND COUNTER-SUBVERSION 
The roots of the RCMP Security Service lie in the First World War when the Royal 
North-West Mounted Police, a paramilitary police force that originated as the Northwest 
Mounted Police in 1873, was charged with carrying out surveillance of ‘enemy alien’ 
populations across western Canada. That surveillance expanded before the end of the war to 
target left-wing radicals and by 1920 the renamed Royal Canadian Mounted Police had taken 
over the domestic security role for all of Canada. In 1921, its main target for the next several 
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decades, the Communist Party of Canada (CPC), appeared on the scene. During the interwar 
period, the RCMP mixed a variety of duties including domestic intelligence. A fledgling 
intelligence branch began to develop but it would not become formalized until the Second World 
War. It would expand rapidly in the aftermath of the war with the dominance of the Cold War. 
Members were primarily drawn from the regular policing side of the RCMP although in the 
1950s the Security Service began to take on civilian members.23   
The Security Service’s centre of attention into the 1960s remained the CPC. It targeted 
the CPC because of both its real and imagined ties to the Soviet Union and because of the 
involvement of a small number of Communists in espionage. Also, of great concern was the 
possibility that Communists were subverting Canadian society from within.24 Counter-
subversion was a key role of those involved in domestic intelligence for the RCMP from its birth 
during the First World War through to the 1980s. The RCMP Security Service shared this trait 
with the FBI and MI5. Hence, the creation of a massive paper trail connected to Canadians, non-
Canadians and their groups and organizations that had little or nothing to do with exposing 
espionage. From 1919 to 1977, the RCMP accumulated 1,300,000 security file entries including 
on over 800,000 individuals.25 To provide a snapshot from a particular year, the RCMP Security 
Service held active files in 1967 on 48,000 individuals and 6,000 organizations with a broad 
definition of what constituted a subversive that included ‘CP of C [Communist Party of Canada] 
member, suspected Trotskyist, self-admitted Marxist, black nationalist, student agitator, 
anarchist, red power advocate, or an associate of communists’.26  
Subversion is also an important concept for understanding the development of counter-
terrorism in the 1970s and represents a transition between the security milieu of the Cold War 
and that which would follow the end of the Cold War. It was no coincidence that in his 1974 
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speech about terrorism, Michael Dare, the head of the Security Service, linked subversion and 
terrorism.  There are several historic reasons for this that stretch beyond Canada. First, there was 
a perceived overlap between subversion, Communism, insurgency, and terrorism in an era when 
definitions of the latter were contested and fluid, not only among academics but among 
governments as well.27 Thus subversion, and terrorism for that matter, could be a tactic of 
Communists or terrorists or insurgents. In his influential Low Intensity Operations: Subversion, 
Insurgency, and Peacekeeping, British general Frank Kitson, who served in Kenya during the 
Mau Mau conflict and in Northern Ireland during ‘The Troubles,’ broadly defines subversion as  
all measures short of the use of armed force taken by one section of the people of a 
country to overthrow those governing the country at the time, or to force them to do 
things which they do not want to do. It can involve the use of political and economic 
pressure, strikes, protest marches, and propaganda, and can also include the use of 
small-scale violence for the purpose of coercing recalcitrant members of the 
population into giving support.28  
The emergence of counter-terrorism within Cold War Canadian domestic security would 
see a strong connection to its traditional role of countering real and imagined Communist 
subversion. When it came to the structures of Canadian security, the model followed was a 
British one. The formal organization of the RCMP Security Service, which did not carry out 
arrests despite its members being largely drawn from the regular police, was modeled 
organizationally after MI5 which had considerable input into Canadian domestic security during 
World War Two and in its aftermath.29  Until 1984 in the UK, MI5, which in a Cold War context 
viewed terrorism as ‘the violent side of subversion’, placed counter-terrorism within counter-
subversion.30 Similarly, into the 1980s, responsibility for non-Quebec nationalism related 
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terrorism lay within the RCMP Security Service’s existing counter-subversion branch, known in 
the 1970s as ‘D’ Operations or ‘D’ Ops for short. 
THE BIRTH OF COUNTER-TERRORISM IN THE SECURITY SERVICE 
The emergence of counter-terrorism within the Security Service began with the FLQ and 
the 1970 October Crisis. This development forced a new stress on the threat of domestic 
politically motivated violence and the Security Service set up a separate branch to concentrate on 
violence related to the cause of Quebec nationalism. Then, in September 1972, the RCMP 
Security Service established the first unit within its counter-subversion branch to respond to the 
threat of international terrorism.  The terrorist attack at Munich in the same month appears to 
have been a key element in emphasising international terrorism as a serious threat to Canada 
particularly since in 1970 Montreal had been selected by the International Olympic Committee to 
host the 1976 Olympic Games. In 1975, due to concerns over the appropriateness of some of its 
activities, particularly in relation to Quebec separatists, which later in the 1970s would lead to an 
official inquiry known popularly as the McDonald Commission, the Security Service received its 
first ever formal mandate from the Canadian government through a cabinet directive although it 
did not carry, in the words of the definitive history of the Security Service, ‘the authority of 
law’.31 The directive listed counter-terrorism among the Security Service’s core functions:  
(a) The preventive function involves the timely use of intelligence to anticipate and 
prevent acts of violence by Terrorists.  
(b) In the event of terrorists planning or committing an act of violence within 
Canada, the RCMP Security Service provides a support/advisory function to Law 
Enforcement Departments. This includes a rapid exchange of intelligence to deal 
with the situation at hand.32  
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The security around the Montreal Olympics has been studied in its own right but, as Dominique 
Clément illustrates, the policing of this global mega event forced greater emphasis on domestic 
counter-terrorism capabilities on the part of the police along with recognition of the threat posed 
by international terrorism.33  
How did the RCMP Security Service understand terrorism and the threat from terrorism in 
this period? In his 1974 speech, Michael Dare explicitly linked terrorism to legitimate grievances 
on the part of those carrying out attacks, a view that perhaps seems extraordinary today but one 
that, as Lisa Stampnitzky points out in Disciplining Terror, was more common in the 1960s and 
1970s.34 ‘There is an element of truth ... in the assertion that political violence is the product of 
“just grievances,” of social deprivations and intolerable oppression’, noted Dare, although he 
added that these grievances did not justify a resort to violence. He went on to outline six 
implications or threats to Canada from international terrorism: 
(1) The general danger to Canada and Canadian interest by Canada's support for a 
party involved in a conflict;  
(2) The specific threat to Canadians related to a conflict by reason of ethnic 
background;  
(3) The threat to foreign officials and premises in Canada and to Canadian officials 
abroad;  
(4) The participation of Canadians in terrorist attacks and/or support for such attacks;  
(5) The possibility of relations within Canada to terrorist activity;    
(6) Concern over the possible use of Canada as a base or place of convenience for 
subversive, espionage or terrorist activity directed against other countries.35 
All six have remained relevant over the nearly 40 years since he listed them. 
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Behind Dare’s speech was the changing domestic security landscape that began in the 
1960s with the rise of Black Power and Red Power movements in the United States but with real 
and imagined spillovers into Canada.36 Indeed, famously, the RCMP Security Service burned a 
barn to the ground in 1972 in order to stop a meeting between FLQ and Black Panther 
members.37 Equally, however, through immigration Canada was becoming increasingly diverse 
and the views of Dare and the RCMP Security Service reflected more broadly wider Euro-
Canadian anxiety about such change that dated from at least the First World War.38 Dare warned 
of the possibility of ‘racially-motivated violence-oriented elements’ specifically referencing 
‘Serb, Croat, African and Caribbean groups’ because of a ‘capacity for violence and social 
disruptions, and their solidarity with international extremist movements and national liberation 
groups. This is particularly true of a small group of black extremists in Canada which has 
assumed a strong support role for Black revolutionaries in Africa and the Caribbean’.39 He added 
Chilean and Irish groups in Canada were also of ‘specific concern’, presumably for their support 
for terrorism elsewhere not as a risk to carry out attacks in Canada. In terminology that reflected 
the counter-subversion and counter-terrorism linkage, he advised that the way to address the 
threat of violence was to have proper intelligence in order ‘to keep track of possible subversive 
activity and combat it effectively…’.40 There was a clear parallel between the two that 
represented a transition between the Cold War and the post 9/11 concentration on terrorism. 
Counter-subversion involved identifying and monitoring Communists and their efforts to 
influence others. It also meant discovering and monitoring those who were Communist 
sympathizers and supporters. Similarly, counter-terrorism required discovering and tracking 
terrorists along with their sympathizers and supporters. Linking the two as well was the notion of 
a foreign ‘other’. The RCMP had historically viewed Communists in Canada, even when the 
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party leadership was dominated by British immigrants such as long-time party leader Tim Buck, 
as associated with ethnic minorities and, of course, the Soviet Union;41 international terrorism 
was likewise viewed as concomitant with minority communities.   
COUNTER-TERRORISM GROWING PAINS 
 Several obstacles lay in the path of acquiring intelligence related to terrorism. The Cold 
War continued to dominate the domestic security scene through the 1970s and 1980s meaning 
that the chief priority of ‘D’ Ops of the Security Service, home of counter-terrorism, remained 
left-wing subversion. Separate desks were established by the Security Service in Ottawa in 
September 1972 to concentrate on Middle Eastern terrorism, undoubtedly as a result of Munich. 
An organizational chart dating from 1974-75 shows several categories related to terrorism. There 
was an Irish Republican Army section on its own and then there was ‘C-1 INTERNATIONAL 
TERRORIST/GUERRILLA SECTION’ with categories such as ‘Arabs’ in Canada as diplomats, 
‘International Terrorism’, ‘Hijackings and Letterbombs [sic]’, and ‘Special projects’. A second 
section, ‘C-2 National Extremists and V.I.P. Security Section’ covered the security of diplomats 
and visiting dignitaries, far-right terrorism, ‘Ethnic Extremists (Yugoslavs etc.)’, ‘Greek and 
Hungarian Extremists’, and research.42  In March 1976, the focus expanded to include Japanese, 
Latin American, and Western European terrorism reflecting the era of left-wing terrorist groups 
such as the Japanese Red Army and the Red Army Faction in West Germany.43 In January 1979, 
the Security Service created ‘Regional Desks’ to cover along geographical as opposed to 
ideological lines the international and national dimensions of a particular terrorist threat (this 
restructuring was still in place two years later--see Figure 1.1, ‘D’ OPERATIONS 
Organizational Chart from April 1981).  Some confusion plainly emerged as a result of the 
restructuring and personnel changes and the Security Service subsequently organized 
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conferences to address key issues such as source recruitment and handling, ‘technical source 
applications’, and liaising with federal government agencies and foreign allies.  The number of 
personnel dedicated to international terrorism directly remained small with 30 (18 from the field 
and 12 from headquarters) invited to attend the gathering.44  
 
FIGURE 1.1 ‘D’ OPERATIONS ORGANIZATIONAL CHART, 24 APRIL 198145 
 
Other problems involved questions of jurisdiction: Canada was a federal state with three 
levels of government. Policing at the provincial level in Quebec and Ontario, Canada’s two most 
populous provinces, and to a lesser extent Newfoundland, was under the control of their 
governments and in several provinces municipal governments held sway over civic police forces.  
The potential for this to become an issue with regard to future terrorism incidents emerged in 
1977 when a non-terrorist hostage taking occurred at a bank in Toronto and the RCMP and 
federal government had no choice but to allow the province of Ontario and the Toronto police 
deal with the incident that eventually ended peacefully. In the end, a memorandum agreed 
between the provinces and federal government before the Montreal Olympics was adhered to 
successfully, although there was clear anxiety in some quarters over the federal government 
having to be subservient in such cases.46 As a senior civil servant from the Department of the 
Solicitor General noted in a 1978 article, this was also a legacy of the terrorist kidnappings of 
October 1970 when consideration had to be given to political responsibility for internal crises 
whereas prior to this event emergency planning had been focused on responding to a nuclear 
attack.47 
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 Practical obstacles existed for the Security Service when it came to investigating 
terrorism inspired from abroad. As during the First World War and the interwar period, the 
Mounted Police found it difficult to collect intelligence about minority communities that it had 
little expertise about in as in this example from 1978.48   
Montreal have conducted extensive investigation into the [deleted under the Access 
to Information Act and Privacy Act (ATIP)] communities within Montreal. Due to 
the difficulties in penetrating these ethnic communities, there have been problems in 
identifying key individuals. However, Montreal have identified [deleted under ATIP] 
as a key figure [deleted under ATIP] with numerous links in Montreal and Toronto.49  
Accordingly, the Security Service relied on informants recruited from within the communities, 
including what was referred to in 1979 as ‘casual sources in various ethnic areas,’50 to supply 
information; this is a pattern seen previously during the First World War and its aftermath when 
the Canadian state constructed some minority ethnic communities as threats in relation to 
Bolshevism; it is a pattern equally evident since the attacks of 11 September 2001, such as in the 
United States where the FBI and New York Police Department have relied heavily on informants 
as part of counter-terrorism investigations.51  As the work of Gary T. Marx and others 
demonstrates, the use of informants in intelligence investigations has long generated controversy 
and criticism because of the perception of ‘fishing expeditions’ and the potential for informants 
to act as agents provocateurs.52 Elements of the former appeared in a report in which the field 
was ‘directed to have casual sources before anything serious occurs - i.e. don't wait until 
something drastic takes place before you try to develop sources’.53 The Security Service would 
also emphasize the need to discover ‘individuals who have the capability or will to participate in 
or support a terrorist act’ instead of taking a blanket approach to ‘a suspect ethnic group’.54 The 
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reports at conferences often offered brief ethnic profiling of communities across Canada, the sort 
of forerunner to a sophisticated programme now run by the FBI in the United States involving 
census material known as ‘domain management’.55 There is a taste of this from the Security 
Service office in the province of Nova Scotia:  
Investigations into the [deleted under ATIP] ethnic community has progressed well 
during the past year. Out of [deleted under ATIP] in Nova Scotia, [deleted under 
ATIP] reside in the Halifax area. New immigration [deleted under ATIP] appear to 
centre in Halifax and, due to their strong cultural ties, many do not speak English. 
For the most part, acculturation has been slow [deleted under ATIP].56 
Interest in some minority communities became more widespread in 1982 in a period of 
heightened concern about the Middle East after the Israeli invasion of Lebanon. In a file entitled 
‘General Conditions and Subversive Activities- Census Re: Immigration Statistics’, the then 
Director General of the Security Service, J.B. Giroux, asked at a briefing about the ‘population 
of the various Arab nationalities in Canada’ including how many there were and where were they 
located.57 The Security Service soon assembled statistics covering from 1971, the date of a 
Canadian census, to 1980 for the number of immigrants from 22 countries to Canada. The 
countries listed were all Middle Eastern and North African: Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Iran, 
Iraq, Libya, Israel, Lebanon, Syria, Oman, Kuwait, Jordan, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Sudan, 
United Arab Emirates, Qatar, People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen, the Arab Republic of 
Yemen, Bahrain, and Cyprus. The immigration figures for Syria, Lebanon, and Israel were then 
added to the 1971 census results for Syrian-Lebanese, which the Security Service inexplicably 
linked, and Jewish ethnic groups to arrive at a clearer idea of the total size of those communities 
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in Canada. The police broke the immigration numbers down further for all 22 countries by the 
Canadian province and city.58  
Through the 1970s, at various points, the Security Service discussed proactive tools for 
dealing with targeted individuals from ethnic communities that again have resonance with a post 
9/11 environment. One was using Canada’s Immigration Act to remove those deemed to be 
security threats. Under the legislation at the time, specifically Section 39 of the Immigration Act, 
individuals deemed a threat to the security of Canada could be deported without an opportunity 
to appeal and without any evidence being given at a hearing simply if two federal cabinet 
ministers signed an authorization to do so.59 Six ‘individuals of interest’ were deported from 
Quebec in the late 1970s using Section 39 warrants although it was stressed by the Solicitor 
General that these should only be used as last resort.60 Additionally, the Security Service 
enjoyed, according to an RCMP memorandum, a strong relationship with the Department of 
Immigration when it came to being able to access records.61 
By 1977 the RCMP was discussing at internal meetings topics still relevant to counter-
terrorism in the 21st century:  
a) Contingency Plans - explanation of Security Service functions in the event of a 
terrorist attack;  
(b) Computerization- discussions and explanations of all efforts will be made to 
provide a viable program;  
(c) Annual Work Plans- clearer identification of national priorities and requirements;  
(d) Nuclear, Chemical or Biological Threat- explanation of our responsibilities and 
position within this community.62 
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In the case of annual work plans, these were in response to a belief in headquarters that Divisions 
‘still do not fully understand or appreciate the requirements and ultimate objectives of 
investigation into terrorism’. As a result, they were encouraged to discuss ‘trends, priorities and 
procedures prior to … ensure a co-ordinated national program outlining national priorities and 
objectives and a unified co-ordination thrust in dealing with terrorism in Canada’.63 
Part of the trend of reorienting toward terrorism involved expanding the expertise levels 
of Security Service personnel with regards to international terrorism. Conferences, seminars, and 
workshops were regularly organized in the latter half of the 1970s by the Security Service when 
resources permitted. These events involved RCMP counter-terrorism personnel but also 
frequently included guests from intelligence partners outside of Canada; the Security Service 
lacked an overseas branch and thus depended on receiving foreign intelligence from allies. 64 At 
an RCMP-organized conference in 1975 in the lead up to the Montreal Olympics, according to a 
heavily censored document, at least five allied western intelligence agencies sent 
representatives.65 In 1978 an International Terrorist Conference was organized for Security 
Service personnel involved in counter-terrorism. It was an opportunity to discuss familiar 
problems with allied American agencies.66  
These events also yield an understanding of the Security Service’s approach to counter-
terrorism as its desks each gave presentations to colleagues; these generally involved two 
components: the nature of the terrorism threat in their respective areas and what they were doing 
in response both directly but indirectly. Reflecting the nature of terrorist events in the 1970s, the 
focus centred on responding to hijackings and hostage takings while the terrorist threat was 
deemed to be from individuals entering Canada from abroad or existing minority ethnic and 
immigrant communities.67 
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 Of particular interest is the ‘D’ Ops International Terrorism Workshop of March 1980 in 
relation to the Security Service’s perception of changing nature of political violence.  A list of 
potential threats contained the usual ones associated with the 1970s, including transnational 
terrorism, and an additional one: ‘Religious Group Terrorism: A new threat, which has become 
more apparent since about 1977, arises from international terrorism on behalf of religious 
groups. The inter-factional struggle currently being waged by Muslim extremists, however, will 
pose only an indirect threat to the internal security of Canada’. Canada was viewed as a potential 
‘soft’ or ‘alternate target’ for those with the United States in their crosshairs.68 
Across these years the Security Service made efforts to interact with the academic world. 
In one instance, the Mounties encountered an early guru of terrorism studies, Brian Jenkins of 
the Rand Corporation; they circulated transcripts of a talk he gave in Calgary.69 In a sign, 
however, that such exchanges with academics were not always deemed beneficial, members of 
the Security Service’s Research and Briefing Section found a terrorism seminar at Carleton 
University in Ottawa only partially useful: 
Our experience generally has been that the information of the academic community, 
being confined to the public domain, tends to be dated.  Thus, they are weak in the 
area of short term projections; their longer term scenarios and forecasting abilities are 
better, but even here their thinking, disappointingly, rarely ventures beyond 
conventional wisdoms. The strength of the academic community in the terrorist field 
is the development of new analytical techniques. The academic community is in the 
forefront of data evaluation, comparative analysis and contributions to policy related 
discussions which affect the government response and contingency planning.70 
SECURITY SERVICE COUNTER-TERRORISM IN THE 1980S 
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At the end of the 1970s, the Security Service offered a forecast of the terrorism landscape 
for the 1980s. It expected levels of political violence ‘to remain constant using methods’ from 
the 1970s with a similar list of targets as well. India was notably absent from the list of countries 
projected to be affected and south Asia never appears to have been a geographic section in the 
counter-terrorism section in ‘D’ Ops. One note did predict the possibility of the arrival of ‘[n]ew 
groups, motivated by hitherto unpublicized goals’ and the Security Service mentioned ‘the recent 
upsurge in nationalism and religion consciousness’, undoubtedly a reference to the Islamic 
Revolution in Iran and the seizure by Islamic extremists of the Grand Mosque in Mecca, Saudi 
Arabia in December 1979 although, conceivably, they could also have had in mind Sikhs in 
India.71  
 By the early 1980s, the Security Service’s non-Quebec nationalist counter-terrorism 
section had existed for roughly a decade. In 1982 it had to respond to small-scale terrorist attacks 
in Canada. One incident resembled nothing that the RCMP had anticipated even though it was 
similar to the Weather Underground attacks in the United States in the late 1960s and early 
1970s. A domestic anarchist group called Direct Action carried out a bombing in Toronto at 
Litton Industries, a company involved in the design of the guidance system for American 
Tomahawk cruise missiles.72  
Other violence was more anticipated at least in terms of the RCMP’s focus on 
international terrorism and ethnic groups within Canada. Armenian nationalists launched a series 
of attacks in Canada, including a bombing in Toronto. The most significant Armenia-related 
terrorist attack, however, occurred in Ottawa on 23 August 1982 when Colonel Atilla Altikat, the 
Turkish Military Attaché to Canada, was shot and killed while stopped at a traffic light. Clearly, 
a professional and well-planned attack, the act, responsibility for which was claimed by the 
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Justice Commandos of the Armenian Genocide, remains unsolved.73 The murder had an 
important impact on the evolution of Canadian domestic counter-terrorism between the October 
Crisis of 1970 and the Air India bombing of 1985. The assassination of a foreign diplomat on 
Canadian soil embarrassed the government of Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau and led to event-
driven change in the organization of RCMP counter-terrorism. The month after the shooting, the 
Security Service Director General ordered that Armenia-related terrorism ‘be given priority over 
all other Security Service investigations’. In October 1982, a reorganization of the Security 
Service’s counter-terrorism section still within ‘D’ Ops took place as it expanded in size (see 
Figure 1.2). Finally, in the only example of directions from the political level in relation to 
international counter-terrorism found in the Security Service records, Trudeau requested directly 
that a briefing paper on terrorism be prepared for him and his cabinet.74 The RCMP was one of 
11 different contributors to the document (External Affairs, Solicitor General, RCMP, Privy 
Council Office, Defence, Immigration, Customs, Transport, Atomic Energy, Control Board and 
Communications) that went through a number of drafts over a two-year period.   
In a contradictory and, at times, self-serving contribution from the RCMP Security 
Service, some of which External Affairs, the lead agency in drafting the report, edited, it warned 
of limited resources that required the police to ‘prioritize the targets which will receive the major 
thrust of Security Service attention relegating lower priorities to a passive collation or 
monitoring mode’. A lack of resources is a common refrain from intelligence agencies. The 
major problem from the perspective of the Security Service, however, did not relate to resources 
but democracy: ‘In a liberal democratic society where legitimate dissent is recognized in law and 
practice, one must recognize the sensitivity of investigating ethnic or other interest groups on the 
premise that there could be, within these groups, elements sympathetic to a terrorist cause, 
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whatever it may be’. As a result of these perceived obstacles, the Security Service claimed 
difficulty in discovering, in somewhat loaded terminology, ‘the identity of the small core of 
Canadians and neo-Canadians who are violence prone and would render active support to foreign 
terrorists intent on perpetrating a terrorist act in Canada’. This coupled with the reality that ‘new 
terrorist groups may suddenly appear or established ones may alter their tactics to include violent 
activities’ meant that, in again echoes of the present, ‘it is not possible to assure total protection 
against terrorism’.75  
In addition, the RCMP produced an aide memoire detailing what it called the 
‘‘Limitations on the capability of Security Service Counter-Terrorism operations’.76 The first six 
points contained within that document retain some relevance to the present and demonstrate the 
complex nature of counter-terrorism investigations, particularly within liberal-democratic states:     
(i) limited manpower resources, which necessitates the prioritization of targeting 
efforts;  
(ii) the sensitivity of investigation ethnic and issue-orientated groups; 
(iii) the difficulty in determining the line that distinguishes legitimate dissent from 
terrorist sympathy and support; 
(iv) the problem of balancing the rights of the individual with the security 
requirements of the State;  
(v) the lack of coordinated analytical resources within the Security and Intelligence 
community;  
(vi) the different interpretation and definitions that various States apply to the field of 
terrorism which makes it difficult for the Security Service to verify information and 
threat assessments;  
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(vii) problems of a legal nature in the conduct of some types of Counter-Terrorism 
investigations, these have been identified by the McDonald Commission [Royal 
Commission of Inquiry into Certain Activities of the RCMP].77 
In spite of these limitations, as of 1983-1984, counter-terrorism had become for the 
Security Service its top priority, with 199 ‘person-years’ allocated which, despite complaints 
about limited resources, it listed as adequate.78  As Figure 1.2 demonstrates, in organizational 
terms, the changeover occurred in October 1982, in the aftermath of the murder of the Turkish 
diplomat.79 Even with its new prioritization, counter-terrorism remained part of the counter-
subversion branch.80 Only at the end of the 1980s and the closing years of the Cold War would 
counter-subversion be disbanded although not by the RCMP but by its 1984 successor, CSIS, 
after e negative publicity associated with the practice and a recommendation to the government 
by a special panel.81 
Ultimately, argued the RCMP Security Service in its May 1983 aide memoire, counter-
terrorism intelligence had two key elements: ‘(i) the production of long range, strategic 
intelligence on emerging trends, issues, and threats; and, (ii) the time sensitive production of 
current intelligence for the purpose of providing an advisory and support role to government and 
operation field or law enforcement bodies’. Its institutional perception was that it covered point 
two ‘adequately’ whereas point one needed improvement.82 History contained in these 
documents and the terrorism in the 1980s suggest the exact opposite that whereas the Security 
Service appeared in many respects to  
 
Figure 1.2, ‘D’ Ops Organizational Chart, October 198283 
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accurately forecast longer term trends in terrorism, or at least recognize potential developments, 
it fell short over the much more difficult task of generating actionable intelligence needed to  
prevent terrorism. That had to do with some of the obstacles the Security Service identified at 
various points. However, it was also about a domestic intelligence agency still in the Cold War 
battling Communist subversion while operating in a Canada changing demographically and 
through urbanization. That skill at collecting intelligence about subversives over decades 
undoubtedly led to an inflated sense of the Security Service’s ability to do the same with those 
engaged in politically motivated violence even as it identified the difficulty of such a task. The 
aide memoire, perhaps emboldened by a perceived success in Quebec at dealing with violent 
separatists, concluded with an assessment that the Security Service’s counter-terrorism 
operations were adequate ‘to meet our present Security and Intelligence community 
commitments’.84 Just over two years later, the Air India bombing would suggest that they were 
not. 
CONCLUSION 
 The RCMP Security Service involvement in the cabinet briefing paper was its last hurrah 
in relation to counter-terrorism. In 1984, the Security Service, due to its involvement in illegal 
and ethically dubious activities in the 1970s in Quebec and elsewhere in Canada, was replaced 
by CSIS, a new civilian intelligence agency. In practical terms, the change was less dramatic: 
many of the new agency’s first employees joined from the now defunct RCMP Security 
Service.85 It would be CSIS that had primary responsibility for counter-terrorism when the Air 
India attack occurred. The RCMP, however, continues to this day to have a role in counter-
terrorism, particularly since CSIS lacks the power of arrest.  
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 Between 1973 when Starnes gave his speech on the threat of international terrorism and 
the creation of CSIS in 1984, the RCMP Security Service had evolved within a Cold-War 
context to deal with terrorism as a security threat. Despite its own perception, the police showed 
strength in terms of strategic intelligence, with an understanding in a broad sense of the nature of 
the terrorism threat in the 1980s. This forecasting included by 1982 the potential for Canada to 
be a ‘staging ground’ for a terrorist attack and the possibility that politically motivated violence 
in relation to Sikh nationalism could be affected by events in India. This was a prophetic take 
considering that the Air India bombing was revenge for the Indian government’s assault on the 
Golden Temple, the holiest site in Sikhism, in June 1984 and the killing of thousands of Sikhs in 
the aftermath of the October 1984 assassination of Indira Ghandi by two of her Sikh 
bodyguards.86 Ultimately, the Security Service was a Cold War institution that while recognizing 
the growing threat of terrorism found it difficult to evolve to deal effectively with this new threat 
through intelligence gathering on the ground. Also in parallel to the Cold War, the Security 
Service viewed certain ethnic communities as effectively an ‘other’ and thus responded by 
interpreting them as potential threats. Such impediments and issues remain relevant to domestic 
counter-terrorism since 11 September 2001 and not just in Canada. 
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